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1 Introduction
Worldwide environmental destruction has been attracting considerable attention.  Obviously, emissions 
from production activities are the major causes of the environmental problems.  When firms generate 
emissions, the conventional wisdom says that the government should intervene to restrict the 
production.  Environmental standards are typical policy measures for this purpose.  The standards 
restrict the level of production and hence the negative externalities generated by emissions are 
internalized.
　 In this age of globalization, however, production and consumption may not be done at home. 
For example, by undertaking foreign direct investment (FDI), firms may not produce in their own 
countries.  The differences in the pollution regulation among countries might cause the pollution 
activities to be relocated in the countries with relatively lower pollution regulations.  When the 
domestic government adopts tough environmental regulations, domestic firms may shift their plants 
abroad.1  Attracting FDI generates employment.  If emission regulations are loose enough abroad, for 
example, environmental damages could become worse as a result of the plant relocation.  That is, there 
usually exist multiple markets.  Thus, the framework of an open economy is indispensable to examine 
emission regulations.
　 These arguments above show that the relationship between the environmental policy and the 
foreign direct investments becomes more important issue.  Nevertheless, there are limited literature 
on the interaction between them.  Barrett [1994] deals with strategic environmental standards in the 
third-country model, however, his model does not contain the foreign direct investments.
　 The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of FDI on emission regulations in the open 
economy.  We consider the strategic aspects of environmental standards with or without FDI, and 
analyze the role of cooperation.
　 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Next section contains the cases where emissions are 
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generated by production.  Our analysis focuses on the effectiveness of environmental standards.  The 
last section concludes the paper.
2 The basic model
In this model there are two exporting countries (labeled by 1,2) and one consuming(third country) 
country.  There is one firm in each exporting country which operates for the oligopolistic market of a 
homogeneous good in the consuming country.
　 The inverse demand function of the oligopolistic good is given by:
p=α－βD,  (1)
where D is the total consumption in the third country.
D=x1+x2, (2)
where xi is the output of oligopolistic good produced by country(firm) i=1, 2.  Production of the good 
causes local pollution.  Firms have the pollution abating technologies.  The governments regulate the 
local pollution by setting a quantity restriction by emission standards.  Average (and marginal) costs of 
producing firm are, given the environmental standards set by the governments,
ki=ci+μ（θi－ zi).  (3)
ci is a constant per unit cost determined by the production technology and factor market conditions. 
μ is a constant unit cost of abatement, θi is the gross pollution per unit, and zi∈(0, θi) is the 
maximum quantity of pollution per unit that the firms are allowed to emit into the atmosphere.  Note 
that the smaller z means the stricter environmental restriction.
　 The profits are given by:
πi=(p－ki)xi. (4)
　 We assume that there are unemployment in countries 1 and 2.  Following Brander and Spencer 
[1987], factor input costs are taken to be the income of the factors which would remain unemployed in 
the absence of the production of the oligopolistic good.  Hence the welfare levels of the country 1 and 2 
are given by following Wi.
Wi=ci xi+πi－φi xi zi,  (5)
where φi  is the marginal dis-utility of environmental damage.
　 We consider the two different scenarios, (see descriptions below), with or without FDI.
・Scenario 1: No FDI appears.  Each firm operates in its own country.  Profit belongs to the country 
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where it operates.
1. Assuming that the firms behave in a Cournot-Nash fashion, we characterize the optimal zi which 
will maximize each country’s welfare.
2. Moreover, we consider the uniform policy reform from non-cooperative equilibrium.  We can 
show that the reform turns to be welfare-improving.
3. We characterize the cooperative equilibrium levels of zci.
・Scenario 2: Firm located in the country 1 is owned by the foreign multinationals of the rest of the 
world.  Profit of the firm 1 no longer belongs to country 1.
1. Assuming that the firms behave in a Cournot-Nash fashion, we characterize the optimal zi which 
will maximize each country’s welfare.
2. Moreover, We characterize the cooperative equilibrium levels of zci .
3. We reconsider the role of the FDI and the levels of restriction.
3 Without Foreign Direct Investment
3.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
The Cournot-Nash non-cooperative equilibrium output is obtained by first order conditions of profit 
maximization.
xi=
α+kj－2ki
3β .  (6)
Totally differentiating xi and πi, we obtain:
dx1=
2μ
3β dz1－
μ
3β dz2, (7)
dx2=－ μ3β dz1+
2μ
3β dz2, (8)
dπi= 4μ3 xi dzi+
－2μ
3 
xi dzj.  (9)
Totally differentiating Wi, we have following formulas:
3βdW1=A1dz1+A2dz2, (10)
3βdW2=A3dz1+A4dz2, (11)
where
A1=[2μ(c1+2βx1) －φ1(2μz1+3βx1)] ,
A2=μ[φ1z1－c1－2βx1] ,
A3=μ[φ2z2－c2－2βx2] ,
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A4= [2μ(c2+2βx2)－φ2(2μz2+3βx2)] .
　 We discuss first the direct effects of each government’s environmental policy on the welfare.  When 
country 1 reduces z1 ,i.e. dz1<0, the total environmental damage in the country 1 is reduced.  Thus, the 
benefit of reducing environmental damage is given by second term in A1, [－φ1(2μz1+3βx1)]dz1>0. 
Tougher standard is good for environment, however, the domestic production shrinks and 
unemployment expands.  These deficits are given by the first term in A1, [2μ(c1+2βx1)]dz1 <0.
　 Second, we examine the external effects of each government’s environmental policy on the other 
country’s welfare.  When country 1 reduces z1, the rival firm operating in country 2 expands the 
prodution and generates more emissions.  The external effects are decomposed into following three 
effects:
　 1. Environmental damage in country 2 increases. (Negative for country 2)
　 2. Employment in country 2 increases. (Positive for country 2)
　 3. Profit of firm in country 2 increases. (Positive for country 2)
These three effects are given by the coefficients of dz1 in A3.
　 Non-cooperative equilibrium can be obtained by setting (dWi/dzi)=0, with A2=A3=0.
zNi =
2μci－βxi(3φi－4μ)
2μφi 
,  (12)
where N denotes the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Uniform policy reform from Nash equilibrium
The uniform reduction in environmental standards is defined as
dz1=dz2=－δ .  (13)
Evaluating the welfare at Nash non-cooperative levels,
2dWi｜zi=zNi=φi xiδ>0  (14)
Thus, we obtain following proposition.
Proposition 1.  Starting from the Nash equilibrium levels, uniform reduction in pollution allowance is 
welfare-improving for both countries.
　 Tougher regulation means the decrease in the firm’s profit, however, the improvement of the 
environmental damage can outweigh the negative effects.  Therefore, as long as policy reform takes 
place uniformly, we can achieve the welfare enhancement for both countries.
3.3 Cooperative equilibrium
　 From former subsection, we obtain the results that countries get better off by reducing their 
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environmental standards uniformly.  For simplicity, we assume identical technologies and marginal dis-
utility of pollution,
ci=c, θi=θ, φi=φ,
we pay attention to the cooperative solution.
　 From the assumption, non-cooperative (and cooperative) solutions become symmetric, i.e., zN1=zN2. 
In order to find the cooperative equilibrium, we define the total welfare W by adding W1 and W2. 
Totally differentiating W,
3βdW=(A1+A3)dz1+(A2+A4) dz2.  (15)
Setting the coefficients of dzi equal to zero and solving simultaneously for zi, we find the cooperative 
equilibrium as follows.
zci=
μc－2βxi(φ－μ)－φβxj
μφ .  (16)
Comparing the solutions between non-cooperative and cooperative ones, we can state following 
proposition.
Proposition 2.  The governments impose more restrictive environmental standards under the cooperative 
equilibrium than that under non-cooperative equilibrium.
Proof.
zNi－ zci= βφxi+2φβxj2μφ ＞0  (17)
　 This is because the international externalities are negative.  Under the cooperative solution 
governments take into account of A2≠0 and A3≠0.
4 With Foreign Direct Investment
Consider the case where the foreign firm in country 1 is owned by the foreign multinationals in the 
rest of the world.  One thing should be noted that the profit earned by the firm in country 1 no longer 
belongs to country 1.  Thus, the welfare of the country 1 consists of employment and dis-utility from 
pollution.
W1=c1 x1－φ1 x1 z1. (18)
4.1 Non-cooperative equilibrium
　 Totally differentiating Wi, we obtain the formulas of welfare changes.
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3βdW1=B1 dz1+B2 dz2, (19)
3βdW2=B3 dz1+B4 dz2, (20)
where
B1=[2μc1－φ1(2μz1+3βx1)] ,
B2=μ[φ1z1－ c1] ,
B3=μ[φ2z2－ c2－2βx2] ,
B4=[2μ(c2+2βx2)－φ2(2μz2+3βx2)] .
Non-cooperative equilibrium can be obtained by setting (dW1/dz1)=0, (dW2 /dz2)=0 and B2=B3=0.
zN1=
2μc1－3βφ1 x1
2μφ1 ,  (21)
zN2=
2μc2－β x2(3φ2－4μ )
2μφ2
.  (22)
Comparing non-cooperative environmental standards, we have following proposition.
Proposition 3.  Suppose that the FDI only takes place in country 1.  When the countries behave non-
cooperatively, the country 1, where the firm is owned by foreign multinationals, applies more severe 
environmental restriction than country 2.
Proof.
zN1－zN2=－ 8(φω＋μc )φ(45φ－28μ )  < 0, (23)
where ω=(α－μθ－c) =3βx1｜z1=z2=0> 0.
　 Recalling that the profit earned by the firm in the country 1 does not belong to country 1, the 
government of country 1 takes account of welfare change through the employment and environmental 
damage, whereas the government of country 2 takes care profit of the firm as well as the employment 
and environment.  Comparing zN1 without FDI to the one in the presence of FDI, we can state that the 
non-cooperative environmental standard with FDI approaches to the cooperative solution.
4.2 Cooperative equilibrium
Totally differentiating W,
3βdW=(A1+A3) dz1+(A2+A4) dz2. (24)
Setting the coefficients of dzi equal to zero, and solving simultaneously for zi, we find the cooperative 
equilibrium,
zc1=
μc－φ(2βx1+βx2)
μφ ,  (25)
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zc2=
μc－φβx1－2βx2(φ－μ)
μφ .  (26)
Comparing the standards between country with FDI and country without FDI, we can obtain following 
proposition.
Proposition 4.  Suppose that the FDI only takes place in country 1.  Under the cooperative equilibrium, the 
country 1 applies more restrictive environmental standard than the other country.
Proof.
zc1－zc2=－ φω－μc2φ(3φ－2μ )  < 0
　 When firm in the country 1 operates through FDI, the environmental standards in cooperative 
solution differ whereas we have symmetric solution without FDI in the former section.  The difference 
of environmental standards stems from the presence of the FDI.  After the foreign multinationals built 
a production plant in country 1, the substantial fixed cost for investment are already sunk.  So the 
country 1 hosting the FDI can set the environmental standards tougher than country 2.
5 Concluding
We have examined the strategic aspects of environmental standards in third-market model.  From 
the common wisdom in the literature of strategic trade policies, countries can subsidize the firm to 
extract the rival’s profit.  This is true to the strategic environmental policies.  When countries set their 
environmental standards non-cooperatively, each country sets relatively laxer level of standard rather 
than the cooperative optimal.
　 In this paper we introduce the foreign direct investment in the country 1.  We obtain the result that 
the presence of the FDI causes country to set more tougher regulation.
　 One thing should be noted that the foreign direct investment in out model is already sunk, hence, 
the foreign multinational can not relocate the plant to other country.  This is a crucial assumption, 
however, our purpose is to investigate the effect of presence of the FDI on the environmental policies. 
The internalization of the FDI is interesting question, however, that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The further extension with internalization of FDI and political processes in more general settings are 
analysed in Ishikawa and Kuroda [2004].
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